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Abstract 
 
An important issue in economics is how market structure affects prices. While the 
standard view is that competition lowers prices, Chen and Riordan (2006) argued that 
with product differentiation it is not exceptional for prices to be higher under duopoly 
than monopoly. This paper empirically investigates one implication from Chen and 
Riordan, namely, that prices are lower under duopoly when consumer preferences for the 
two products are similar, and they are more likely to be higher under duopoly if consumer 
preferences for the two products are more diverse. Focusing on the price for cable 
modem Internet access, with or without competition from a DSL provider, and using 
education dispersion and ethnic diversity as proxies for consumer preference diversity, 
we find empirical support for this implication. In markets where preference diversity is 
low, competition reduces prices. As preference becomes more diverse, the negative effect 
of competition on prices diminishes; and when preference diversity is high enough, 
competition increases prices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
How does market structure affect prices?  The standard view is that competition 
lowers prices.  Recently, however, Chen and Riordan (2006; hereafter, C-R) have argued 
that under product differentiation it is not exceptional for prices to be higher under 
duopoly competition than under monopoly.  In a general discrete choice model of product 
differentiation, they find that the comparisons between duopoly and monopoly prices 
depend on the balance of two contrasting economic effects: the market share effect and 
the price sensitivity effect.  The market share effect is that a reduced quantity per firm 
under duopoly motivates the firms to cut price below the monopoly level.  The price 
sensitivity effect is that a steeper demand curve resulting from greater consumer choice 
under competition encourages the firms to raise price.  The consumer value distributions 
for the two conceivable products determine the relative strength of these effects, and 
whether competition leads to a higher or lower price than monopoly.2 
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the effects of competition on the 
price for cable modem Internet access.  We consider a data set that includes two market 
structures for high-speed Internet access, the monopoly market in which there is a single 
provider of Internet access through cable modem, and the differentiated duopoly market 
in which there is a cable modem and a digital subscriber line (DSL) provider.  We 
develop an empirical model that examines the possibility that prices can be higher under 
duopoly than monopoly when consumer preferences for the two products are relatively 
diverse, an insight from the recent theoretical work of C-R.  Using education dispersion, 
                                                 
2 Other theoretical studies have also found that prices can be higher with more firms, but they tend to 
assume asymmetric information (e.g., Stiglitz, 1987; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; Janssen and Moraga-
González, 2004), to rely on mixed strategies (e.g., Rosenthal, 1980), or to contain a spatial structure with 
perfect negative preference correlation (Perloff et. al., 2005; Chen and Riordan, 2007). In C-R’s general 
discrete choice model, there is complete information and firms use pure strategies. 
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measured by the standard deviation of the population’s number of years of schooling, as a 
proxy for consumer preference diversity, we find that in markets where education 
dispersion is low (at the 25th percentile), competition reduces monthly subscription prices 
by about $4.  As education dispersion increases the negative effect of competition on 
prices diminishes; and when dispersion is high enough (at the 75th percentile), 
competition increases prices by about $2.55.  This result is robust to the use of an 
alternative proxy for consumer preference diversity that measures the distribution of 
ethnicities among individuals within a given market population. 
Other empirical studies have also found that competition sometimes increases 
prices.  For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) provide survey evidence that 
automobile tire prices are somewhat higher in local markets with two dealers rather than 
one; Perloff et. al. (2005) find that new entry raises prices in the anti-ulcer drug market; 
Ward et. al. (2002) present evidence that the entry of private labels raises prices of name-
brand goods in the food industry; and Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) find that airlines 
raise route prices when Southwest opens new routes to the same destination from a 
nearby airport.  Our paper contributes to this empirical literature by offering new 
evidence from the high-speed Internet access market.  In particular, we show how price 
differences between monopoly and duopoly vary systematically with certain measures of 
consumer preference diversity.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical background 
underlying our empirical analysis and outlines the conditions whereby competition can, 
conceivably, lead to an increase in price.  Section 3 describes the data and empirical 
model.  Section 4 presents estimation results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We are interested in the market for residential high-speed Internet access.  This is 
a market with two potential differentiated products, cable modem and DSL.  A consumer 
would purchase only one of the products, so a discrete choice model is appropriate. 
As in C-R, we assume that the preferences of a consumer are described by 
reservation values for the two goods, ( 1 2,v v ), where 
_
[ , ]iv v v−∈  and 
_
0 v v
−
≤ < ≤ ∞ .  To 
connect with our empirical work closely, we focus on one class of consumer valuation 
distributions studied in C-R, the joint uniform distribution.  Specifically, we assume that 
( 1 2,v v ) are uniformly distributed on a rectangular area on the 1 2v v−  space that is formed 
by segments of four lines with the following inequalities: 
1 2
1 2
2(1 ) 2;
,
a v v
b v v b
+ ≥ + ≥
≥ − ≥ −   (1) 
where [0, ]a∈ ∞  reflects the dispersion in consumer valuations for Internet access and 
[0, 1]b∈  reflects the diversity in consumer preferences for cable modem versus DSL 
products.  This area defines the support for ( 1 2,v v ), Ω, and the joint probability density 
function is 
1 2 1 2
1( , ) , ( , )
2
v v v v
ab
φ = ∈Ω   (2) 
Figure 1 illustrates Ω for representative values of a and b = 1.  As explained in  
C-R, this particular model has the interesting property that it contains both the Bertrand 
and Hotelling duopoly model as limiting cases.  When b → 0, Ω converges to an upward 
sloping line and in the limit the model becomes the standard model of Bertrand 
competition with a downward sloping demand curve.  On the other hand, when a → 0, Ω 
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converges to a downward sloping line and in the limit the model becomes one of 
Hotelling competition. 
For this model, C-R shows that the variance and the correlation coefficient are, 
respectively: 
2 2
1 2
2 2
1( ) ( ) ( ),
12
( )( ) ;
Var v a b Var v
a b a b
a b
= + =
− +ρ = +
 
and the difference between the monopoly price pm and the symmetric duopoly price pd is 
2
3 2 20
4 3
4 2 1 224 4 4 max{ ,0} 1
3 6 3
1 1
2
d m
b a if a b
bp p ab b b if b a b
ab if b a
− − < < − −− = − − + + − ≤ < + + − + ≤
(3) 
 It follows that pd > pm if (3 2)(7 2)0
8
b ba
b
− −< <  and b > 2
3
, which holds if a is 
small enough relative to b and b is above a certain critical value, or if ρ is small and 
Var( iv ) is high enough; otherwise p
d ≤ pm.  In other words, competition increases price if 
consumer preferences are sufficiently negatively correlated and diverse.3  In these 
situations, the residual demand for each firm under duopoly is steeper than the demand 
curve under monopoly, and this price sensitivity effect dominates the market share effect 
under competition, resulting in an equilibrium duopoly price that is higher than the 
monopoly price. 
 
                                                 
3 C-R show more generally that consumer preferences need not be negatively correlated for price to be 
higher under duopoly than under monopoly, but preference diversity is always necessary for competition to 
increase price. 
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The contrasting effects highlighted by the theory suggest that competition in 
differentiated-product markets does not necessarily lower prices.  The direction of the 
effect of competition on prices can depend crucially upon the heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences.  Specifically, competition can increase prices when the diversity in 
consumer preferences for cable modem versus DSL products (b) is high relative to the 
dispersion in consumer valuations for Internet access (a).  We do not test the theory 
directly as this would require measures of a and b, which are not available.  Instead, we 
investigate the possibility that competition can increase prices with a reduced-form model 
that compares the duopoly and monopoly prices for cable modem Internet access, while 
controlling for cost and demand factors.4  Model estimates are used to assess whether the 
difference between duopoly and monopoly prices is larger in markets with higher 
education dispersion, a proxy for diversity in consumer preferences.5 
3.1 Sample data 
The product market under investigation is residential high-speed Internet access.  
The product permits household consumers to use a high-speed connection to the Internet 
to obtain high-bandwidth information, music and video libraries, interactive gaming 
services, video-on demand, etc.  High speed differs from dial-up Internet access with 
respect to two characteristics, always-on functionality and speed.  Always on is a 
                                                 
4 We do not estimate the effects of competition on DSL prices. To the extent that Internet accesses through 
cable modem and DSL are horizontally differentiated products, we expect that DSL price can also be 
higher with competition from cable than without the competition, when preference is sufficiently diverse.   
5 While it is not possible to say that education dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of the 
population’s number of years of schooling, would increase b more than a, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
it leads to more diversity in consumer preferences. The higher education dispersion is in the market the 
more likely it is that consumer preferences for cable Internet versus DSL are highly diverse. The empirical 
result that pd–pm becomes higher, or positive, with higher education dispersion would be consistent with the 
key insight from the theory. 
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constant connection to the Internet whenever the computer is on; a telephone call is not 
required to establish connection.  Speed, measured in megabytes per second (mbps), is 
the time it takes to send and receive information to and from the home computer.  The 
FCC (2001) defines high-speed access as supporting, in both the Internet-to-household 
(downstream) and the household-to-Internet (upstream) directions, speeds greater than 
0.2 mbps.  This is about four times faster than dial-up access through a telephone line. 
The differentiated products of interest are cable modem and DSL.6  Cable modem 
access is provided by the local cable-television (TV) operator using hybrid coaxial-fiber 
architecture.  Cable operators provide downstream Internet access over their own network 
and upstream access via a telephone line (i.e., one-way capability), or both upstream and 
downstream over the entire cable network (i.e., two-way capability).  One-way access, 
however, is not really high-speed; the service is not always on, so subscribers must place 
a dial-up telephone call to upload data to the network; and the upstream speed is the same 
as dial-up Internet.  While cable modem subscribers share the network with other active 
users they have a much higher bandwidth threshold relative to DSL because the cable 
system typically contains more fiber.  Interestingly, many cable operators upgraded their 
systems with fiber and two-way capability in the mid- to late-1990s for the provision of 
digital, pay-per-view and video-on demand TV services. 
DSL is provided by the local telephone company using copper telephone wires 
and a DSL access multiplexer.7  DSL subscribers have a dedicated connection with the 
telephone company’s central office, but the speed is lower than cable modem, and the 
                                                 
6 High-speed access is also available through fiber-to-the-home, satellite, fixed and mobile wireless, and 
power-line products. FCC (2006) data at December 31, 2005 show that cable modem (58 percent) and DSL 
(40 percent) comprise almost all residential high-speed access lines. 
7 The multiplexer separates voice and DSL traffic, routes multiple DSL subscribers to the Internet 
backbone through one connection, and provides engineering quality control functions. 
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quality of the connection degrades with distance from the central office.  Connection 
quality is also affected by the presence of load coils between the household and the 
central office (i.e., local loop).8  The provision of DSL can involve up to three separate 
entities, the telephone company, the DSL provider and the Internet service provider.  By 
contrast, the cable modem product is typically a “one-stop shop” service.9 
The geographic market of interest is the cable operator’s service region or “city 
market.”  The unit of observation is cable modem brand j = 1, 2, …, J provided by the 
incumbent cable operator in Oregon city market i = 1, 2, …, n.  The decision to study 
Oregon markets is deliberate.  Both the Oregon Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and 
Qwest, the regulated statewide local-exchange authority, publicly provide network data 
that can be used to instrument for competition in the empirical model.  Table 1 shows that 
Oregon cable system characteristics compare reasonably well with the average for the 58 
states, districts and territories of the U.S. at 2004. 
Data on cable operator’s location and ownership for 114 Oregon markets are 
sourced from Warren Publishing (2006).  These data are matched with price, brand, 
infrastructure, demographic and regulatory information from both cable operator and 
telephone company web sites, Telcordia (2000), the Oregon PUC web site and the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2006).  After eliminating markets with incomplete data the sample 
reduced to 93 markets, of which, 35 have cable modem access.  19 of these 35 markets 
                                                 
8 In a traditional telephone network, load coils are placed intermittently along the local loop to prevent 
degradation of the quality of voice calls. While load coils boost the strength of voice calls, they do not 
permit DSL signals to pass through them easily, if at all. 
9 A freeway provides a useful analogy for comparing DSL versus cable modem access. In terms of 
performance, DSL provides a dedicated lane with a low speed limit, while cable modem users share the 
freeway with other users but have a much higher speed limit. Because DSL is a dedicated lane, some 
consumers may also believe that it is more safe or secure than cable.   
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are considered monopoly, i.e., they are served by a cable operator only, and 16 are 
duopoly10, i.e., they are served by a cable operator and a telephone company.11 
3.2 Two-step selection model 
Selection into the restricted price sample results from cable operator’s optimizing 
decisions that may not be independent of prices.  For example, unobserved market 
conditions and/or firm characteristics may also affect prices so that the error terms in the 
two equations are correlated.  To obtain consistent estimates, we first estimate the 
selection equation, compute the inverse Mills ratio, and include this in the cable modem 
price equation as an additional regressor. 
Let the cable operator’s decision to provide the cable modem product in market i 
be based on expected profits: 
*
i i= ' '+ +γ w η xi iuπ   (4) 
where wi is a vector of market-specific cost and demand variables that affect variable 
profits and fixed costs, xi is a vector of variables that measure consumer preferences and 
competition from telephone companies providing DSL, γ and η are vectors of parameters 
and u is an error.  The exogenous variables in w are: 1,000 houses per square mile 
(Density); mean household income in $1,000 (Income); percentage of non-white 
population (Non-white); 1,000 houses (Size); and a qualitative variable that equals one 
when the cable system is two-way capable and zero otherwise (Two-way).  Because they 
may behave differently to single-system operators, we also include a qualitative variable 
                                                 
10 Four of the 16 duopoly markets are served by three companies. However, we do not consider the third 
company, which is a “service provider,” to be a serious strategic player as it provides DSL through leased 
telephone infrastructure. Service providers also have very low market share. At December 31, 2005, they 
accounted for less then four percent of total U.S. DSL access lines (FCC, 2006). 
11 Data required to measure the market-specific provision of cable modem and DSL access were obtained 
from Warren Publishing and by using online reverse telephone books with broadband service locaters to 
obtain service plans by provider for a sample of household addresses within a market. 
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that equals one when the cable operator is a multiple-system operator and zero otherwise 
(MSO).12  We also include a qualitative variable that equals one when the cable network 
is owned by a co-operative or municipality (Co-op).  The vector xi contains: average 
number of years of schooling for the population over 25 years of age (Education); 
standard deviation of the number of years of schooling for the population over 25 years 
of age (Educ_dispersion)13; and a qualitative variable that equals one when the local 
telephone company provides DSL and zero otherwise (Duopoly).   
Although expected profits are not observable to the researcher, it is possible to 
observe when the cable operator provides cable modem access in market i when       
Cable modemi = 1 if * >0iπ  and Cable modemi = 0 if * 0iπ ≤ .  The probability of 
providing cable modem Internet access is: 
*
i i i i( >0)= ( ' ' ) ( ' ' )i iProb Prob u F< + = +γ w η x γ w η xπ  (5) 
where F(·) is the standard normal distribution function.  Equation (5) implies the usual 
probit model for dichotomous choice under the assumption that the cable operator knows 
the random component and maximizes profits. 
The equilibrium price for cable modem brand j in market i is: 
i ij i= ' ' ( ' ' )ij i ijP ε+ +ρσ λ + + εβ x δ z γ w η x   (6) 
                                                 
12 For example, Chipty (1995) argued that MSOs with a higher concentration of national cable-TV systems 
and subscribers obtain lower cost deals from program suppliers. Relatively large MSOs, considering the 
provision of cable TV and Internet access, may obtain similar deals from equipment suppliers, service 
contractors, advertising agencies, etc., and/or may have reputation advantages.  
13 Years of schooling for Education and Educ_dispersion are calculated from the distribution of the 
population over 25 years of age with: less than 9th grade; 9th to 12th grade (no diploma); high school 
graduate; some college, no degree; associate degree, bachelor’s degree; and graduate or professional 
degree. 
 11
where P is the monthly subscription price for cable modem access with self installation 
and own modem, zij = [z1ij, z2i], z1ij is a vector of brand-specific characteristics, z2i is a 
vector of market-specific cost and demand controls, 
λi(γ'wi + η'xi)= f(γ'wi + η'xi)/F(γ'wi + η'xi) 
is the inverse Mills ratio, f(·) is the standard normal density function, β and δ are 
parameter vectors, ε is an error, ρ is the correlation between u and ε and σε is the error 
standard deviation.  The errors u and ε are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with 
E(u) = E(ε) = 0 and Cov(u, ε) = 2
1
ε
ρ
ρ σ
  
.  The vector of brand-specific characteristics z1ij 
contains downstream cable-modem speed in mbps (Speed) and a qualitative variable that 
equals one when cable-modem access is offered to households with existing cable-TV 
service and zero otherwise (Bundle).  The vector of market-specific cost and demand 
controls z2i comprises Density, Income, Non-white, Size and Co-op.  As additional 
controls, we also include dummy variables in z2i for the five multiple-system operators in 
the price sample.14 
Theory and previous studies guide a priori expectations for price equation 
estimates.  Cable modem prices are expected to increase with Speed.  Many cable 
operators provide existing cable-TV households with a discount for subscribing to cable 
modem access.  A negative sign on Bundle would reflect this strategy.  Because much of 
a cable operator’s outside plant is shared among houses in a given geographic location, 
an inverse relationship exists between marginal costs and housing density.  As such, a 
negative sign is expected for Density.  Demand should be higher in higher-income 
                                                 
14 Eleven different cable operators serve the 35 markets in the price sample. Five are multiple-system 
operators, Charter Communications, Comcast, Crestview Cable Communications, Millennium and 
Willamette Broadband, serving 29 markets. 
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markets, so a positive relationship is expected between Income and Price.  Eisner and 
Waldon (2001) suggest household preferences for communications vary by race.  While 
Non-white controls for this effect, its sign remains an empirical question.  Size 
approximates the number of houses in the market.  When demand is higher in markets of 
greater size, a positive relationship between Size and Price is expected.  However, this 
effect could be dampened, or even reversed, when size conveys cost advantages. 
3.3 The effects of competition on prices 
Measuring preference diversity and/or how preferences for different products are 
correlated is difficult.  Construction of the key variables of interest would require, for 
example, an appropriately sized sample of consumer’s valuations for cable Internet and 
DSL products for each market.  These measures could also conceivably be “backed out” 
from structural estimates of a differentiated-products model that permits unobserved 
preference heterogeneity to vary by product.15  Unfortunately, cable companies do not 
provide their customer’s valuations to the public, nor do they readily share the micro or 
aggregate market share data required to estimate a discrete choice model for Internet 
access with the appropriate specification of preference heterogeneity. 
The alternative approach is to obtain an indicator for preference heterogeneity that 
is more easily observed and intuitively appealing.  One such indicator is education 
attainment.  Because consumers with different education backgrounds are likely to 
evaluate the relative merits of competing products differently, they should have different 
                                                 
15 For example, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) use micro data on consumers television choices to estimate a 
discrete choice demand model with a variance-covariance matrix that permits unobserved preference 
heterogeneity to vary by product and to be correlated between products. 
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preferences for cable modem versus DSL accesses to the Internet.16  We thus use the 
within-market standard deviation of the population’s number of years of schooling (i.e., 
Educ_dispersion) as an indicator of consumer preference dispersions.17  The higher 
Educ_dispersion is in the market the more likely consumer preferences for cable Internet 
versus DSL products are highly diverse. 
Because this is a first attempt to empirically examine a key insight from a new 
theory, we employ a reduced-form framework that utilizes variation in the market 
structure and education level of Oregon high-speed Internet markets.  We control for 
cost, demand and Education and estimate several variants of the price equation (6) with 
additional controls, alternative specifications of the market structure vector xi and with 
different methods of estimation.  The economic effect of interest is 
∂P/∂Duopoly = β1 + β2 Educ_dispersion, where β1 and β2 are the parameters on Duopoly 
and Duopoly×Educ_dispersion, respectively.  An estimate of β1 < 0 (> 0) shows that 
competition, measured by a discrete change from monopoly to duopoly, decreases 
(increases) cable-modem prices.  Estimates of β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 show that the effect of 
competition on prices becomes less negative, and possibly positive, for higher dispersion 
in the population’s number of years of schooling.  A finding of this nature is consistent 
with the implication outlined in the theoretical background. 
 
 
                                                 
16 In this horizontal setting, consumers have preference differences for cable modem versus DSL products 
and we assume that the intensity of this preference diversity varies with education dispersion. For example, 
one could speculate that highly educated consumers have a strong preference for the performance or, 
security, of one product over another. Less educated consumers may simply have a strong historical 
preference for their cable provider over their telephone company, or, vice versa. 
17 For robustness, we also estimate the price equation with an alternative proxy for consumer preference 
diversity that measures the distribution of ethnicities among individuals within a given market population.   
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3.4 Summary statistics 
A full description of the variables and data used to estimate the selection and price 
equations are provided in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.  For price equation (6), 
average market size and housing density are 12,982 houses and 719 houses per square 
mile, respectively.  The average number of years of schooling for the sample population 
is about 13, and about 12 percent of the population are non-white.  Mean household 
income is $43,992.  The average cable modem brand has 2.70 mbps of downstream speed 
and a monthly subscription price of $41.01.  Nearly 60 percent of cable modem brands 
provide a discount for existing cable-TV households.18  43 of the 84 cable modem brands 
are provided in monopoly markets with an average price of $40.87.  The remaining 
brands are provided in duopoly markets with an average price of $41.16.  A t-test 
(t = 0.13; P-val = 0.90) does not reject the null that the $0.29 difference between duopoly 
and monopoly prices is equal to zero. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
4.1 Single-equation OLS and selection two-step estimates 
The data and empirical model described in Section 3 are used to investigate the 
relationship between competition and cable Internet subscription prices.  Single-equation 
OLS and selection two-step estimates of the price equation are presented in Table 4. 
Column’s two and three report estimates of the baseline model specification (i) 
without Duopoly and without dummy variables that control for the presence of multiple-
system operators in the sample.  Column two provides OLS estimates while column three 
accounts for selection by additionally including as a regressor the fitted value of the 
                                                 
18 Some cable operators provide a price discount and additional downstream and upstream speed. 
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inverse Mills ratio, 
∧λ , obtained from probit estimation of the first-step selection 
equation.19  The estimated coefficient on 
∧λ  is significant at the ten percent level and 
several of the coefficient estimates in the two-step model are quite different form their 
OLS counterparts.  The two-step estimates suggest that cable Internet prices depend on 
Speed and Bundle only. 
Model (ii) estimates, reported in column’s four and five, include the five MSO 
dummy variables in the price equation as additional controls.  The estimated coefficient 
on 
∧λ  is not significant; after controlling for the observed MSO status of individual cable 
providers there is no correlation between the error in the equation determining the 
provision of cable Internet access and the error in the equation determining prices.  
Moreover, the OLS and two step models provide reasonably similar estimates of the price 
equation.  Most of the estimated coefficients on the control variables have signs that 
follow a priori expectations.  Cable modem prices increase with Internet Speed but the 
rate of increase diminishes for higher levels of this characteristic.  Households with 
cable-TV service receive about a $10 discount per month when purchasing the cable 
modem product.  Prices decrease with the cost proxy, Density, but these cost-related 
pricing advantages appear to moderate in markets with high housing density.  Prices 
increase with household Income. 
Model (iii) estimates, reported in column’s six and seven, include Duopoly as an 
additional regressor in the price equation.  Again, the estimated coefficient on 
∧λ  is not 
significant and single-equation OLS and two-step estimates provide similar results.  The 
                                                 
19 Selection equation estimates for 93 markets are provided in Table 5. Results show that the local cable 
operator is more likely to provide cable modem Internet access in markets with relatively higher household 
density and in markets where the underlying cable-TV network is two-way operable.  
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control variables also have similar signs and magnitudes to those reported for model (ii).  
Estimates of ∂P/∂Duopoly = β1 show that the average cable modem price in duopoly 
markets is about $0.99 (OLS) to $0.37 (two-step) lower than the monopoly price, but 
these effects are not significantly different from zero. 
4.2 IV estimates 
The evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that selection is not an issue for 
estimating cable Internet subscription prices and that prices can be modeled separately by 
single-equation OLS.  However, it is possible that the reported OLS estimate of 
∂P/∂Duopoly reflects unobserved market conditions, such as advertising intensity, 
bandwidth availability, etc. that are correlated with competition and prices.20  Model (iv) 
and model (v) account for the potential endogeneity of Duopoly with IV estimation of the 
price equation.  Theory suggests that IV candidates should come from the telephone 
company’s profit-maximizing decision to enter high-speed Internet markets and provide a 
DSL product.  Our excluded instruments are DSLAM (equals one when the telephone 
company has installed a DSLAM in market i and zero otherwise) and Deload (equals one 
when load coils in the local loops for market i have been removed and zero otherwise).  
Installation of a DSLAM is a necessary but not sufficient condition for DSL service 
provision by the local telephone company, while Deload measures the attractiveness of 
telephone company’s service areas in terms of expected market size, service quality and 
profits.  Because they are sunk cost decisions for the telephone companies, DSLAM and 
Deload should not be correlated with cable Internet prices. 
                                                 
20 The direction of these potential biases is not clear. For example, the cable operator’s unobserved 
advertising intensity may have an entry-deterrence or market-expansion effect. A positive correlation 
between advertising and price, and a negative (positive) correlation between advertising and Duopoly, will 
bias the estimated coefficient on Duopoly down (up). 
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IV estimates of the price equation with Duopoly, model (iv), are reported in 
column two of Table 6.  The F statistic of the first-stage reduced-form equation and the 
Hansen J statistic show that the excluded instruments, DSLAM and Deload are relevant 
and valid.21  IV estimates are similar to the OLS estimates reported in column’s six of 
Table 4.  The average cable modem price in duopoly markets is about $1.06 lower than 
the monopoly price, but this effect is not significantly different from zero. 
This analysis may mask differences in prices due to the combination of 
competition and the diversity in consumer preferences, as suggested by the theoretical 
model.  Model (v) estimates, reported in column three of Table 6, evaluate the interaction 
effect by including Duopoly×Educ_dispersion in the price equation.  Again, the 
F statistic of the first-stage reduced-form equation and the Hansen J statistic show that 
the excluded instruments, DSLAM, Deload, DSLAM×Educ_dispersion and 
Deload×Educ_dispersion are relevant and valid.22  The IV estimates of the coefficients 
on Duopoly and Duopoly×Educ_dispersion are both statistically significant at the five 
percent level and result in ∂P/∂Duopoly = -37.0 + 12.77Educ_dispersion.  These 
estimates show the effect of competition on prices becomes less negative, and then 
positive, for higher diversity in consumer preferences, as measured by the within-market 
standard deviation of the number of years of schooling (Educ_dispersion).  When 
evaluated at the 25th percentile for Educ_dispersion of 2.58 the average duopoly price is 
$4.04 below the monopoly price.  When evaluated at the mean Educ_dispersion of 2.87 
                                                 
21 The F statistic in the first-stage regression indicates that the excluded instruments are not weakly 
correlated with Duopoly (F = 220; P-val = 0.00). The partial R2 of first-stage excluded instruments is 0.84. 
The J-statistic (J = 2.93; P-val = 0.13) suggests the instruments and price-equation errors are independent. 
22 The F statistics in the first-stage regressions indicate that the excluded instruments are not weakly 
correlated with Duopoly (F = 138; P-val = 0.00) and Dispersion× Educ_dispersion  
(F = 95.5; P-val = 0.00). The partial R2’s of first-stage excluded instruments for Duopoly and  
Dispersion× Educ_dispersion, respectively, are 0.59 and 0.56. The J-statistic (J = 0.96; P-val = 0.62) 
suggests the instruments and price-equation errors are independent.  
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the average duopoly price is $0.32 below the monopoly price. When evaluated at the 75th 
percentile for Educ_dispersion of 3.10 the average duopoly price is $2.54 above the 
monopoly price. 
Column four of Table 6 provides IV estimates of the price equation (v) using a 
log-linear functional form.  The coefficient estimates for ∂logP/∂Duopoly and 
∂logP/∂Duopoly×Educ_dispersion are statistically significant and exhibit a qualitatively 
similar pattern to the linear estimates.  When evaluated at the 25th percentile the duopoly 
price is $5.12 below the monopoly price.  When evaluated at the 75th percentile the 
average duopoly price is $3.12 above the monopoly price. 
For robustness, we also estimated linear and log-linear forms of the price equation 
with an alternative (horizontal) proxy for consumer preference diversity that measures the 
distribution of ethnicities among individuals within a given market population.  
Ethnic_diversity is Theil’s entropy measure calculated for seven ethnic groups.23  When 
one ethnic group comprises the entire population, entropy (Ethnic_diversity) equals zero.  
In this market, it is more likely that consumer preferences for cable Internet versus DSL 
are not that diverse.  When all ethnic groups have an equal share of the population, 
entropy (Ethnic_diversity) equals its maximum positive value.  Here, consumer 
preferences for cable Internet versus DSL are more likely to be highly diverse.   
Model (vi) estimates using Ethnic_diversity as the proxy for consumer preference 
diversity are reported in columns’ five and six of Table 6.  In the linear model, IV 
estimates of the coefficients on Duopoly and Duopoly×Ethnic_diversity are both 
                                                 
23 For market i, entropy (Ethnic_diversity) is 
1
log
K
k k
k
s s
=
−∑ , where sk is the ratio of ethnic group k’s 
population to the market’s total population and k = white, black or African American, American Indian and 
Alaska native, Asian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander, some other race, and two or more races. 
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statistically significant at the five percent level and continue to show that the effect of 
competition on prices becomes less negative, and then positive, for higher values of 
Ethnic_diversity.  When evaluated at the 25th percentile of Ethnic_diversity of 0.138 the 
duopoly price is $2.72 below the monopoly price.  When evaluated at the mean 
Ethnic_diversity of 0.205 the duopoly price is $0.82 below the monopoly price. When 
evaluated at the 75th percentile for Ethnic_diversity of 0.246 the duopoly price is $0.35 
above the monopoly price.  Estimates from the log-linear model in column six show a 
qualitatively similar pattern.  When evaluated at the 25th percentile the duopoly price is 
$3.57 below the monopoly price.  When evaluated at the 75th percentile the duopoly and 
monopoly prices are almost the same. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper empirically examined the price effects of competition in the high-
speed Internet access market.  Our key finding is that the presence of a DSL provider in 
competition with a cable modem provider may or may not lower the cable provider's 
price, depending crucially on some measure of consumer preference diversity.  
Specifically, DSL competition lowers the cable modem Internet access price if consumer 
preference diversity is small, but raises the price if consumer preference diversity is large.  
This result is robust whether we use the population’s education dispersion or ethnic 
diversity as the measure of preference diversity. Our finding, consistent with the 
theoretical work from C-R, sheds new light on the long-standing question in economics 
concerning how market structure affects prices. 
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TABLE 1 
CABLE OPERATOR CHARACTERISTICS 2004 
Number of … Total U.S. State average Oregon 
States, districts, territories 58 n.a. n.a. 
Cable systems 8,409 145 107 
Communities served 34,456 594 412 
Basic-TV subscribers 65,296,014 1,125,793 759,744 
Expanded-basic TV subscribers 29,980,818 516,911 464,496 
Coaxial miles of plant 1,415,690 24,408 20,076 
Homes passed by network 92,589,724 1,596,375 1,009,762 
NOTES. State average is for 58 states, districts and territories. n.a. denotes not applicable. 
 
Source. Warren Publishing (2004). 
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TABLE 2 
SELECTION EQUATION VARIABLES 
Variable Description and data source 
Mean 
(s.d.)
Cable modem 
 
 
One when the cable operator provides cable modem Internet access, zero 
otherwise. Source: Warren Publishing (2006); company web sites; various 
online broadband service locators. 
0.376
(0.487)
 
Density 
 
1,000 houses per square mile. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
0.536
(0.431)
Income 
 
Mean household income in $1,000. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
41.93
(8.813)
Education 
 
Mean number of years of schooling for the population over 25 years of 
age. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
12.45
(0.853)
Educ_dispersion 
 
Within-market standard deviation of the number of years of schooling for 
the population over 25 years of age. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
2.775
(0.493)
Non-white 
 
Percentage of non-white population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
11.17
(10.15)
Size 
 
1,000 houses. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
12.98
(35.50)
MSO 
 
 
One when the cable operator is a multiple-system operator, zero 
otherwise. Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; 
various online broadband service locators. 
0.806
(0.397)
 
Co-op 
 
 
One when the cable network is owned by a co-operative or municipality. 
Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; various 
online broadband service locators. 
0.048
(0.214)
 
Two-way 
capability 
One when the cable system is two-way capable, zero otherwise. Source: 
Warren Publishing Inc. (2006). 
0.419
(0.496)
NOTES. s.d. is standard deviation. Number of observations is 93. 
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TABLE 3 
PRICE EQUATION VARIABLES 
Variable Description and data source 
Mean 
(s.d.)
P 
 
 
Monthly subscription price for cable modem access with self installation 
and own modem ($). Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company 
web sites; various online broadband service locators. 
41.01
(10.45)
 
Duopoly 
 
 
One when the local telephone company provides DSL, zero otherwise. 
Source: Warren Publishing (2006); company web sites; various online 
broadband service locators. 
0.488
(0.503)
 
Density 
 
1,000 houses per square mile. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
0.719
(0.487)
Speed 
 
Downstream cable modem speed in mbps. Warren Publishing (2006); 
company web sites; various online broadband service locators. 
2.695
(1.696)
Bundle 
 
 
One when cable modem access is offered to households with existing 
cable-TV service, zero otherwise. Warren Publishing (2006); company 
web sites; various online broadband service locators. 
0.595
(0.494)
 
Income 
 
Mean household income in $1,000. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
43.99
(6.736)
Education 
 
Mean number of years of schooling for the population over 25 years of 
age. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
12.98
(0.928)
Educ_dispersion 
 
Within-market standard deviation of the number of years of schooling for 
the population over 25 years of age. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
2.871
(0.411)
Non-white 
 
Percentage of non-white population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
12.60
(23.50)
Size 
 
1,000 houses. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
 
0.719
(0.487)
Charter 
 
 
One when the cable operator is Charter Communications (an MSO), zero 
otherwise. Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; 
various online broadband service locators. 
0.310
(0.465)
 
Comcast 
 
 
One when the cable operator is Comcast (an MSO), zero otherwise. 
Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; various 
online broadband service locators. 
0.167
(0.375)
 
Crestview 
 
 
One when the cable operator is Crestview Cable Communications (an 
MSO), zero otherwise. Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company 
web sites; various online broadband service locators. 
0.107
(0.311)
 
Millennium 
 
 
One when the cable operator is Millennium (an MSO), zero otherwise. 
Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; various 
online broadband service locators. 
0.059
(0.238)
 
Willamette 
 
 
One when the cable operator is Willamette Broadband (an MSO), zero 
otherwise. Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; 
various online broadband service locators. 
0.095
(0.295)
 
Co-op 
 
 
One when the cable network is owned by a co-operative or municipality. 
Source: Warren Publishing Inc. (2006); company web sites; various 
online broadband service locators. 
0.048
(0.214)
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TABLE 3 
PRICE EQUATION VARIABLES 
Variable Description and data source 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Deload 
 
 
One when the load coils in the local loops have been removed and zero 
otherwise. Source: Source: Telcordia (2000); telephone company web 
sites; State PUC website. 
0.214
(0.413)
 
DSLAM 
 
 
One when the telephone company has installed a DSLAM, zero 
otherwise. Source: Telcordia (2000); telephone company web sites; State 
PUC website. 
0.536
(0.502)
 
Ethnic_diversity 
 
 
 
Within-market entropy measure calculated for seven ethnic groups: white; 
black or African American; American Indian and Alaska native; Asian, 
Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander; some other race; and two or 
more races. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). 
0.205
(0.099)
 
 
NOTE. s.d. is standard deviation. Number of observations is 84. 
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TABLE 4 
OLS AND TWO-STEP SELECTION ESTIMATES OF CABLE INTERNET PRICES 
 Without MSO dummies With MSO dummies With MSO dummies 
Independent variable OLS Two step OLS Two step OLS Two step 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
Constant  1.004 -4.386  41.80**  37.34**  40.11**  37.42** 
 (20.84) (24.70) (16.43) (18.37) (17.07) (18.19) 
Duopoly     -0.992 -0.369 
     (1.114) (1.540) 
Density -9.858 -6.931 -10.92** -9.737** -10.24** -9.487** 
 (7.762) (6.520) (4.690) (4.640) (4.550) (4.645) 
Density2  2.991  1.986  4.323*  4.005*  4.014  3.878* 
 (3.427) (3.203) (2.473) 2.256 (2.485) (2.259) 
Speed  5.586***  6.324***  10.35***  10.23***  10.25***  10.19*** 
 (1.850) (1.436) (2.500) (1.382) (2.496) (1.383) 
Speed2 -0.515* -0.636*** -1.226*** -1.212*** -1.207*** -1.204*** 
 (0.261) (0.230) (0.326) (0.208) (0.326) (0.209) 
Bundle -10.86*** -10.81*** -9.710*** -9.766*** -9.773*** -9.797*** 
 (1.793) (1.576) (1.137) (1.099) (1.135) (1.098) 
Income  0.012  0.037  0.278**  0.269**  0.243*  0.252* 
 (0.140) (0.146) (0.129) (0.132) (0.141) (0.139) 
Education  1.638  1.792 -1.207 -0.997 -0.937 -0.908 
 (1.381) (1.554) (1.028) (1.195) (1.176) (1.215) 
Educ_dispersion  7.195**  6.638 -1.109 -0.604 -0.994 -0.647 
 (3.171) (4.094) (2.529) (3.386) (2.558) (3.364) 
Non-white -0.114 -0.072  0.010  0.020  0.022  0.025 
 (0.151) (0.166) (0.094) (0.115) (0.098) (0.115) 
Size  0.038**  0.032  0.002  0.002  0.006  0.003 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.019) 
Co-op  6.392**  5.709  5.516**  5.987***  5.432***  5.303** 
 (2.476) (3.743) (2.596) (1.301) (1.612) (2.656) 
∧λ (γ’wi + η’xi)   3.684*   1.369   1.180 
  (1.930)  (1.501)  (1.733) 
R2  0.593   0.817   0.818  
σε  7.151  6.945  4.979  4.498  4.997  4.469 
NOTES. Dependent variable is cable modem Internet subscription price. OLS is single-equation OLS estimates. Two-step is 
two-step selection estimates. ***significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.1 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors in OLS models. Heckman-corrected standard errors in two-step models. 
MSO estimates not reported for (ii) and (iii) . n = 84. 
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TABLE 5 
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF SELECTION EQUATION 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
Independent variable ∂F/∂w s.e. ∂F/∂w s.e. ∂F/∂w s.e. 
Density  1.086** 0.480  1.057** 0.473  1.079** 0.465 
Density2 -0.402 0.252 -0.400 0.250 -0.384 0.281 
Income  0.002 0.009  0.005 0.010  0.006 0.010 
Education -0.058 0.113 -0.075 0.116 -0.106 0.133 
Educ_dispersion  0.422* 0.220  0.401* 0.227  0.381 0.243 
Non-white -0.019 0.012 -0.021 0.013 -0.023* 0.013 
Size -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Co-op  0.039 0.238  0.122 0.280  0.165 0.293 
Two-way  0.820*** 0.085  0.829*** 0.084  0.829*** 0.084 
MSO    0.130 0.125  0.141 0.125 
Duopoly      0.130 0.175 
Log likelihood -22.10  -21.83  -21.58  
Pseudo R2  0.641   0.645   0.650  
NOTES. Dependent variable is Cable modem. ***significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level;  
*significant at the 0.1 level. s.e. denotes robust standard errors. Duopoly. ∂F/∂w shows the effect of a 
marginal change in w on the probability that the cable operator provides cable modem access. n = 93. 
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TABLE 6 
IV ESTIMATES OF CABLE INTERNET PRICES 
   Linear   Linear Log-linear   Linear Log-linear 
 Model (iv) Model (v) Model (v) Model (vi) Model (vi) 
Constant  39.99***  59.44***  4.527***  44.00***  3.840*** 
 (17.22) (18.20) (0.687) (10.10) (0.345) 
Duopoly -1.059 -37.01** -1.131** -6.632** -0.198** 
 (1.201) (12.60) (0.410) (2.889) (0.098) 
Duopoly×Educ_dispersion   12.78**  0.390**   
  (4.492) (0.145)   
Duopoly×Ethnic_diversity     28.37**  0.804* 
    (13.82) (0.449) 
Density -10.19** -9.129** -0.225* -8.168** -0.215 
 (4.606) (4.260) (0.136) (4.191) (0.134) 
Density2  3.993  4.701*  0.122  3.897*  0.102 
 (2.504) (2.459) (0.079) (2.285) (0.073) 
Speed  10.24***  9.948***  0.257***  9.852***  0.251*** 
 (2.509) (2.426) (0.091) (2.451) (0.093) 
Speed2 -1.206*** -1.123*** -0.027** -1.140*** -0.027** 
 (0.328) (0.317) (0.012) (0.320) (0.012) 
Bundle -9.777*** -10.19*** -0.262*** -10.04*** -0.257*** 
 (1.137) (1.143) (0.039) (1.140) (0.039) 
Income  0.241*  0.144  0.004  0.235*  0.006 
 (0.142) (0.135) (0.004) (0.139) (0.004) 
Education -0.918 -1.608 -0.062 -1.099 -0.037 
 (1.201) (1.213) (0.042) (0.906) (0.029) 
Educ_dispersion -0.986 -1.896 -0.105   
 (2.567) (2.720) (0.099)   
Ethnic_diversity    -19.96* -0.572 
    (11.56) (0.362) 
Non-white  0.023 -0.296* -0.008*   
 (0.099) (0.153) (0.005)   
Size  0.006 -0.002 -0.000 -0.007 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Co-op  5.299***  4.424***  0.135**  5.122***  0.154** 
 (1.664) (1.629) (0.051) (1.916) (0.066) 
R2  0.818  0.820  0.727  0.822  0.728 
σε  4.429  4.409  0.161  4.938  0.181 
F (Duopoly)  219.9***  138.2***  138.2***  125.3***  125.3*** 
F (Duopoly×Educ_dispersion)   95.47***  95.47***   
F (Duopoly× Ethnic_diversity)     37.87***  37.87*** 
Shea (Duopoly)  0.842  0.585  0.585  0.873  0.873 
Shea (Duopoly×Educ_dispersion)   0.562  0.562   
Shea (Duopoly×Ethnic_diversity)     0.762  0.762 
Hansen J  2.394  0.962  0.550  1.553  1.290 
NOTES. Dependent variable is cable modem Internet subscription price. ***significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; 
*significant at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. F tests the null that excluded instruments in the first stage are 
jointly equal to zero. Shea partial R2 is for excluded instruments in the first stage. Hansen J tests the null of zero correlation between 
instruments and errors. MSO estimates not reported. n = 84. 
 
